

~~SECRET~~

"A. WITH RESPECT TO PERSONNEL

That the Agency personnel competence level be raised. The Agency should continually strive to achieve this and if necessary reduce its present work load to expedite its realization. Necessary steps are:

- "1. Elimination of personnel who can never achieve a sufficiently high degree of competence to meet the C.I.A. standard. This will entail a substantial reduction in present personnel. There is no place in C.I.A. for mediocrity."

Comment:

A special Employment Review Board has been established to eliminate mediocrity among the present employee group. This Board is composed of the Assistant Director for Personnel, the Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel, and four other high officials of the Agency.

- "2. Review and improvement of recruitment plans and procedures in order to obtain higher quality applicants for Agency jobs. The time required to process them should be reduced."

Comment:

Final selection of professional personnel is a prerogative properly exercised by office heads or their designees. Firm requisitions which define as precisely as practicable the qualifications required in the job to be filled have been prepared.

Recruitment is receiving much greater attention in the various offices of the Agency and closer coordination in this activity by both personnel and operational staffs is expected

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

to have a beneficial effect upon the quality of incoming personnel. Experimentation with recruitment teams composed of operational personnel working temporarily with professional recruitment officers in the field is being carried out.

We have sponsored a consultant program which will see the Agency represented in fifty selected colleges and universities shortly after the first of the year. The primary mission of this corps of consultants is to identify outstanding student leaders and cultivate their interest in careers in the intelligence field.

With the establishment of a formal Career Service in the Agency, it is expected that highly qualified personnel will be attracted to and will remain with the Agency. The fact that we now have a firmly established Career Service program is being exploited in our recruitment efforts.

- "3. Continual improvement of the present excellent training facilities and capabilities in all covert activities to keep step with future requirements."

Comment:

The Office of Training is continually attempting to improve its training facilities and capabilities in all covert activities to keep step with future requirements. We have specifically developed during the past year five new courses.

~~SECRET~~

- "4. An intensified training program to include those key personnel in the covert services who require additional training, by rotation through C.I.A. training facilities. At present at least 10 per cent of total covert personnel should be in training."

Comment:

A program was initiated whereby five per cent of the personnel will be in some type of covert training at all times. This figure was arrived at after careful study and examination at all levels of the Agency. Ten per cent is regarded as too high a number in relation to the commitments which the Agency is undertaking in the covert field.

- "5. Assignment to field stations and to country areas of only those people who are fully qualified to handle the highly specialized problems involved."

Comment:

We are finding it difficult to fulfill this undertaking while at the same time providing necessary training to key personnel and staffing new projects in critical areas of the world.

- "6. Maintaining the position of Director above political considerations in order to assure tenure and continuity as in the F.B.I."

Comment:

The Director has maintained a completely non-political approach to the problems of the Agency. Relations with the Congress are non-partisan.

~~SECRET~~

"B. WITH RESPECT TO SECURITY

That greater security be developed at all levels of the Agency to the end that the good name of the United States and the fulfillment of C.I.A.'s important mission may not be jeopardized. The following steps should be taken to accomplish these objectives:

- "1. Elimination, to the maximum extent practicable, of provisional and preliminary clearances in the security processing of prospective Agency personnel."

Comment:

It is recognized that it is undesirable to have provisional and preliminary clearances and every means possible is being used to discourage and eliminate such clearances. There is need, however, for an exception to cover hardship cases, usually in the clerical category, where the delay in committing a person to employment might result in his loss to the Agency. It is considered essential to continue present exceptions in the clerical field particularly in order to compete with others with shorter "processing" periods.

- "2. Improved and more standardized security processing of alien operational personnel prior to their use by the covert services overseas."

Comment:

A new greatly improved and standardized security and counter-intelligence procedure for processing alien and U. S. operational as well as support personnel for use by the covert services has

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

been completed, and is being put into effect immediately.

- "3. Immediate completion of full field investigations and polygraph examinations of the several hundred Agency personnel who have not yet been fully processed."

Comment:

All staff personnel have been fully processed, with the exception of some few military personnel who were accepted on the basis of ten years satisfactory previous active service and upon whom full field investigations have not yet been completed by the Security Office. With respect to the polygraph program, there remain at this time only seven staff employees who have not received a polygraph interview.

- "4. Establishing of uniform and tighter security procedures at headquarters and suitable safeguards in the field the better to insure the security of the Agency's facilities, operations, sources, and methods."

Comment:

The Security Office is exerting every effort to standardize and tighten security procedures and safeguards both at headquarters and in the field. Among the items being given particular attention at the moment are improvement of the classified waste procedures, requiring clearances of char force personnel, tightening requirements and giving special training to the guard force, tightening entrance requirements of Public Building Service

employees into Agency facilities, strengthening the Top Secret

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Control procedures and installing additional electric alarm systems in field offices.

- "5. Insurance of the closest possible coordination of the counter-espionage activities of the covert services with the over-all counterintelligence activities of the Office of Security to prevent, or detect and eliminate, any penetrations of C.I.A."

Comment:

On 20 December 1954 a new Senior Staff to supervise and direct the CIA counterespionage responsibilities was formed. This Staff includes a unit charged with the specific function of working closely with the Security Office in connection with possible or actual penetrations of CIA.

STATINTL

- "6. Augmentation of the present sound policy of polygraphing all new employees and all personnel returning from overseas assignments to include periodic rechecks of all personnel, on a more comprehensive basis, whenever effective counterintelligence practices indicate."

Comment:

This policy is in effect at the present time in that all new employees and all overseas returnees are being polygraphed. Repolygraphing is being accomplished whenever indicated.

- "7. Creation of greater security consciousness on the part of all personnel by improving initial indoctrination courses and by conducting regular "security awareness" programs."

~~SECRET~~

Comment:

The initial security indoctrination lecture has been revised and improved. Planning is now underway to carry out Agency-wide security reindoctrination.

- "8. Imposition of severe penalties upon employees at any and all levels who advertently or inadvertently violate security."

Comment:

New security regulations set forth minimum penalties for security violations in each case, as opposed to the former regulations which set forth the penalties as a "guide." It is felt that the establishment of minimum penalties will result in a more rigid application of the penalties across the board.

- "9. Establishment of a uniform system for the submission by all overseas missions of regular reports on the status of personnel, physical, documentary and related elements of security. Such reports should be submitted to the Office of Security with copies to the Inspector General and to the appropriate division of the Deputy Director of Plans."

Comment:

Senior Representatives who have permanently assigned Security Officers are presently submitting regular periodic reports on the status of personnel, physical, documentary and related elements of security to headquarters for action by the Security Office and Area Division concerned, as well as other appropriate headquarters components, including the Inspector General if appropriate.

Action is presently being taken to establish a uniform periodic reporting system for all overseas field stations covering the elements of security referred to above.

"10. Periodic security inspections by the Security Office of overseas missions and of DD/P's divisions, staffs, and facilities in the United States."

Comment:

The Director of Security is now making an inspection which will cover various missions and stations in the Western Europe and Eastern Europe areas. These will be instituted as a regular routine practice.

"11. Rigid adherence to the 'need-to-know' requirement as the basis for dissemination of classified intelligence developed by the covert services and for intra-Agency dissemination of classified data."

Comment:

The Clandestine Services make use of four separate mechanisms for the dissemination of classified intelligence which is collected by them in accordance with the provisions of These are:

a. Dissemination by CS report to the interested components of CIA and the IAC members.

b. Dissemination by CSIB report to those individuals in CIA and other Government offices who have a "need-to-know."

STATINTL

SECRET

This procedure is used for the dissemination of sensitive information about individuals and groups of individuals who are regarded as security suspects or potential security suspects.

c. Dissemination by memorandum addressed to a specific officer in CIA or in one of the Government departments.

This restricted procedure is used for the dissemination of positive information of a highly sensitive or, in some cases, of a sensational nature.

d. Dissemination by word of mouth. This procedure is used in the most sensitive cases, not otherwise covered by the procedures outlined in b. and c. above.

"12. Continuous indoctrination and guidance to correct the natural tendency to overclassify documents originating in the Agency."

Comment:

A CIA Classification Officer has been appointed for the indoctrination and guidance of CIA personnel in the matter of applying the proper classifications to sensitive material.

25X1A

SECRET

25X1A

Approved For Release 2002/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001500050001-1

Approved For Release 2002/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001500050001-1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001500050001-1

"16. Formulation for immediate implementation of emergency plans and preparations, geared to the specific needs of each overseas mission and station, to insure, as far as possible, adequate safeguarding of personnel and safeguarding or destruction of material, in the event of emergency."

Comment:

Each overseas CIA mission or station is required to have an evacuation plan. This plan is to consist of two major phases--scheduled evacuation and disaster evacuation. This plan includes:

- a. Destruction or removal of files.
- b. Disposition or transfer of property.
- c. Disposition of funds.
- d. Implementation of plans to preserve or destroy equipment.
- e. Preservation and safekeeping of inventories of each individual's personal property and value thereof to facilitate the settlement of claims in the event of loss.

"17. Concentration of CIA's headquarters operations in fewer buildings with increased emphasis in the interim on improvement of the physical security of CIA's many buildings and the classified data and materials contained therein."

Comment:

Steps are being taken to obtain one building for CIA.

Approved For Release 2002/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001500050001-1

SECRET

SECRET

"C. WITH RESPECT TO COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS

That one agency be charged with the coordination of all covert operations in peacetime, subject to the provision that necessary flexibility be achievable in time of war. The covert operating capabilities of C.I.A. must be continually improved. Steps toward these ends are:

- "1. Implementation of NSC 5412 which now makes C.I.A. the coordinating agency pending a national emergency"

Comment:

This is being done.

- "2. Preparation and test of a readily implementable plan for the immediate and effective availability of local covert assets to theater commanders at the outbreak of war in their areas."

Comment:

Command of CIA wartime field operations in support of military operations will be vested in a CIA Force Commander in each theater. The CIA Senior War Planners now overseas at the military theater level, working continuously with the military commander, have prepared organizational plans for their respective CIA wartime theater forces. We have determined the required wartime locations of major operational and logistic bases, estimated the capability required, and

SECRET

partially motivated all of the major base locations designated. A CIA Global War Plan ^{is being prepared} which will integrate the organizational planning of the Senior War Planners and provide for the wartime changes required in the CIA headquarters structure.

- "3. Immediate resolution, by the National Security Council, of the misunderstandings that still exist between C.I.A. and some of the Armed Services with respect to 'agreed activities'."

Comment:

A paper on "agreed activities" has been signed by the chiefs of intelligence of the Armed Services, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

- "4. Development of better understanding between other agencies and CIA relative to exploitation of Soviet and satellite defectors."

Comment:

Considerable progress has already been achieved in this direction: the vast majority of defector cases are now handled as a matter of routine.

"3. A greater interchange of information, at all working levels, between CIA and the military services regarding their intelligence programs and policies. "

Comment:

The signing of the "agreed activities" paper will necessarily result in a much greater interchange of information, originally at the upper levels and eventually at all levels, between CIA and the military services in connection with their several intelligence programs and policies.

25X1A9a

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Control procedures within CIA are such as to insure, barring major human error, that policy guidance is requested when required, and followed when obtained.

Continuing improvement of coordination can best be accomplished by making the present system work more effectively. This is being done, by:

- a. Enforcing high standards of discipline;
- b. Applying sound judgment to the requirements of security and the principle of need-to-know;
- c. Striving for continued improvement of personal relations between key officers and their opposite numbers;
- d. Educating CIA officers as to the desirability and necessity--from their own standpoint--of obtaining appropriate policy guidance, and, conversely
- e. Educating State officials as to the necessity of their maintaining complete discretion in any handling of CIA matters.

"7. Establishment of definite world-wide objectives for the future, and formulation of a comprehensive long-range plan for their achievement."

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2002/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001500050001-1

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001500050001-1

"D. WITH RESPECT TO ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

That an intensive organizational study be made to the end of streamlining functions, clarifying lines of responsibility and authority, reducing overhead and increasing efficiency and effectiveness. From our relatively brief examination of organization it is obvious that:

- "1. The present elaborate staff structure of the Deputy Director for Plans should be simplified."

Comment:

Study of the organization of the Clandestine Services is in process.

- "2. The covert organization should be located, organized and administered as to maintain maximum security with reference to personnel and activities."

Comment:

A study is being made of this subject.

- "3. The Inspector General should operate on an Agency-wide basis with authority and responsibility to investigate and report on all activities of the Agency."

Comment:

This is in effect.

- "4. The activities of the Operations Coordination Board under the H.S.C. should be broadened to provide the D.C.I. with adequate support on the more important covert projects."

~~SECRET~~

Comment:

More effective use of OCB in support of certain important CIA projects could be realized more effectively through the establishment of special and compartmented working groups composed of officers fully empowered by their principals to command prompt and effective action.

Such groups should be held to minimum size and report directly to the Board. They should by-pass the remainder of the OCB machinery, except, perhaps, for keeping the Board executive officer generally informed of their activities on an Eyes Only basis. They should be brought into being only in cases of real necessity. On a few occasions in the past comparable groups, in fact, have been employed successfully and their use might well be regularized and extended.

- "5. Despite the recommended reduction in present personnel and budgetary economies that the C.I.A. must continue to grow in capacity until it is able to meet, entirely, its national commitments."

Comment:

A periodic review will be made of how well the Agency is meeting its national commitments. The semi-annual report to the National Security Council affords a propitious moment for this review.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

"6. Centralized accommodations, hand-tailored to its needs, should be provided to house the Agency."

Comment:

Action is being taken to obtain one building to house C.I.A.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2002/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001500050001-1

"E. WITH RESPECT TO COST FACTORS

That although the activities of CIA should be expanded, costs of present operations should be reduced. This can be in part accomplished through:

- "1. The exercise of better control over expenditures for all covert projects, and specifically that (except for those of an extremely sensitive nature) they be made subject to review and approval by the Agency's Project Review Committee."

Comment:

There are two basic existing complementary Project Review Committee procedures outlined below.

- a. Upon recommendation of the Project Review Committee, the Director's approval of an operational program constitutes the frame of reference for individual project control throughout the year. Such control is performed on a daily basis with the Office of the Comptroller.

25X1C

Approved For Release 2002/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-04718A001500050001-1

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

- "2. Furnishing the Comptroller (under proper security provisions) with sufficient information on all covert projects to enable him to exercise proper accounting control on a fiscal year basis."

Comment:

The Comptroller is furnished the following specific documents or information.

- a. Copies of all operational programs.
- b. Copies of all operational program changes.
- c. Copies of all administrative plans.
- d. Coordination by signature prior to approval on all
25X1A8a
☐ operational projects.
- e. Copies of FI project budgets.

Beginning in January 1955, FI projects will be made responsive to fiscal year allocations as follows:

- a. All projects with an annual cost of \$100,000 or more will be approved on a direct fiscal year basis.
- b. Although reviewed on a calendar basis, all FI projects with an annual cost less than \$100,000 will require fiscal year planning, budgeting, approval and allocation. As each one expires on a calendar year basis, it will receive renewal, if appropriate, on a strictly fiscal year basis and the total of such project authorizations will not exceed the fiscal year limitations as approved in the country program.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
EYES ONLY

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	<i>DD/A</i>		
2			
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	<i>L. G.</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>17 Feb.</i>
2			
3			

Document No. _____
No Change in Class. ☐
☒ Declassified
Class. Changed To: TS S *(C)*
Auth.: HR 70-2
Date: *11-30-78* BY *35*

- | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL | <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION | <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE |
| <input type="checkbox"/> ACTION | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN |
| <input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT | <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE | <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION | <input type="checkbox"/> FILE |

Remarks:

*Horowitz is edited version
of comments on Doolittle report.*

CONFIDENTIAL